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As globalization continues apace and demand for trade liberalization remains strong among 
developed and developing countries, growing concern about environmental amenities, food 
safety, and human health has given rise to policy that can significantly curtail international trade. 
By exposing countries to foreign pests and disease, trade has undoubtedly imposed considerable 
damage on food systems and ecosystems. In some cases, however, regulation intended to protect 
a nation’s food supply, and environmental and human health serves to protect domestic 
producers at the expense of free trade. Paradoxically, as the food supply has grown safer and 
environmental protection stronger, the level of acceptable risk to human and environmental 
health has grown smaller, particularly in developed countries. This has yielded demand for ever-
more stringent regulation. As the Doha Round of trade talks continues, environmental and 
resource issues present a challenge to the World Trade Organization (WTO), which must 
determine mechanisms to address environment and food contamination while precluding the use 
of environmental and health policy as trade barriers. It is important for the international 
community to recognize the interdependence of trade and resource policy and to agree to a 
framework that measures risk as accurately as possible and weighs it against the benefits of 
trade. In such a framework, the best available science must be accepted as a foundation for 
policy rather than demagoguery and a precautionary approach. Economics offers such a 
framework.   In this paper, we discuss the ways in which national governments, firms, and individuals 
respond to policy related to food safety, environmental protection, and trade. These responses 
must be considered in the development of policy to ensure the best possible outcomes. We 
develop a model of risk analysis that relies on interdisciplinary knowledge and the best available 
science. It accounts for uncertainty about policy impacts and scientific knowledge and 
incorporates stochastic environmental factors. We argue that use of such a model in the 
development of health and environmental policy can overcome capture by domestic forces 
opposed to trade liberalization. The effectiveness of policy, of course, is dependent upon firm 
and consumer response to policy. We consider the optimization of exporting firms amid a 
framework of import inspection and find that increased inspection may not reduce risk to food 
safety or the environment. Section 1 describes the impacts of international transfer of species and 
genetic material, paying particular attention to the introduction of alien invasive species. Section 
2 discusses issues surrounding trade in environmental amenities. Food safety and environmental 
regulations are reviewed in Section 3, along with mechanisms by which such policy can serve as 
a proxy for protectionists. Section 4 develops a risk assessment model that can be used in policy 
design. Section 5 considers the role of institutional, firm and individual behavior in the 
development and effectiveness of policy. Section 6 summarizes our analysis in offering an 
agenda for trade talks. 
Section 1: Gene and Species Transfer 
The transfer of genetic material and species among nations is central to the protection of natural 
resources and human health. Though these transfers receive less attention in public debates than 
commodities trade and financial transfers, they are of paramount importance in a world of 
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accidental and can be responsible for significant environmental and health benefits or costly 
damage. For instance, in many parts of the world, nutritional needs are primarily met by the 
cultivation of crops intentionally introduced from other regions (Hoyt 1992). The United States 
is the leading producer of corn and soybean, crops with origins in Mexico and China, 
respectively. On the other hand, 80 percent of endangered species worldwide are threatened by 
invasive alien species, which are responsible for nearly half of all invertebrate extinctions with 
known causes (Stein and Flack 1996; Wilcove et al. 1998). 
  The two most significant benefits of international gene and species transfer are their 
contributions to food provision and chemical pest control reduction. As already mentioned, much 
of the world’s food is produced by crops that humans introduced from foreign lands. None of the 
staple crops in North America are indigenous. The grasses that occupy U.S. pastureland were 
intentionally introduced to provide better livestock grazing. Many of the fruits consumed today 
are the product of plant breeding with genes from different regions. Genes from Andean corn, 
carefully bred in Mexico City, ended a century-long effort to improve the nutritional content of 
corn and yielded modern corn. The assault of the rusts on cereal crops has led to famine over the 
course of human history. An intense international effort to develop rust resistance in wheat has 
yielded a partial solution and perhaps averted untold human misery. The work of transferring 
rust resistance in rice to the other cereals proceeds. Gene transfer will be integral to producing 
the agricultural productivity gains necessary for feeding a world of 10 billion people. 
  In addition to improving agricultural production, international species transfer can also 
benefit the environment by offering alternatives to chemical pest control. The use of predator 
species to control pest populations is fundamental to biological control, a relatively 
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predator species are introduced to ecosystems. In other cases, indigenous predator populations 
are protected to control pest populations. As environmental awareness has grown, demand for 
chemical-free alternatives to pest control has increased. Alien species can be substitutes to 
chemical herbicides, fungicides, and pesticides, which can cause wide-ranging changes in eco-
systems by affecting nontarget species and polluting water resources. For instance, several 
parasitoids were successfully introduced in the United States to control the alfalfa weevil, itself 
an invasive alien species from Europe. Absent biological control, the alfalfa weevil caused 
damage throughout the United States and induced farmers to spray crops one or more times per 
year (Stoner 2006). While species introductions can provide a valuable method of pest control, 
they can also backfire and cause significant damage to ecosystems and native species. In some 
cases, biological control has led to the extinction of native species, and in at least one case, the 
extinction of an entire genus (Strong and Pemberton 2000).  
  Gains from genetic and species transfers are likely to persist, though many of the most 
beneficial transfers, such as those that have yielded modern agriculture, have already occurred. 
The persistence of beneficial transfers, however, requires knowledge and proper valuation of 
biodiversity and potential benefits of its uses. Developing countries that supply organisms for 
international transfer have not realized much economic gain because such transfers have public-
good characteristics. The importation of many seeds or genes, for instance, need occur only once 
to supply the importing country with an indefinite stock of regenerating biological material. 
Because of its public-good nature, biodiversity is undervalued by source countries, which are 
typically unable to capture the full benefit of their preservation effort (Zilberman 1992). 
Countries like Brazil or Indonesia, for instance, have little incentive to preserve the genetic 
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companies. 
  Policy is needed to increase preservation of ecosystems like rainforests, which are home 
to vast amounts of biological material. It is estimated that biodiversity loss is the largest source 
of nonclimatic global change and is more costly, at present, than global warming (Mooney and 
Hobbs 2000). The development of royalty schemes can ensure that source-countries derive 
economic benefit from resource transfers. However, even ex post transfers undervalue resource 
preservation because they do not recognize the option value of protecting biodiversity for future 
uses. Zilberman (1992) suggests ex ante payments based on option value to provide incentives 
for source countries to maintain their biological resources. Information about biological 
resources is seriously lacking and research in this area is underfunded (Meyers 1992). It may be 
that little can be done to prevent the disappearance of some rainforests, but at least research can 
document what is likely to be lost and suggest preservation of some key species or products that 
are likely to have beneficial uses in the future. We suspect considerable benefit can be derived 
from international cooperation to identify, study, and document biological resources.  
  Not all species and gene transfers are beneficial and many can be quite costly. Nonnative 
species are spreading at faster and faster rates, imposing costs on the global economy on the 
order of $1.4 trillion every year (Pimentel 2002). Despite the increasing rate of invasions, only 
10 percent of introduced species will become established, and only 10 percent of those will 
become pests (Williamson 1996). Regardless, the spread of invasive alien species has altered 
ecosystems, reduced biodiversity, endangered human health, fouled water sources, destroyed 
agricultural land, and significantly altered the evolutionary process. These tremendous costs, 
combined with the fact that an established invasive species can seldom be eliminated and that the 
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one of the most critical issues facing the global community. The problem, as we will discuss, is 
largely an economic one. 
  The spread of invasive species and the consequent homogenization of the earth’s 
ecosystems are accelerating with the pace of movement of people and commodities across 
countries. Trade is the primary pathway by which nonnative species are introduced to a region, 
often accidentally by piggy-backing on traded commodities.  
  Alien species invasions are typically the unintended consequence of market transactions 
that fail to consider the cost to society of invasive species introductions. But unlike other 
externalities economists consider, such as pollution, alien species invasions are self-perpetuating. 
Once an alien species is established, the individual or firm cannot correct behavior to eliminate 
or reduce the cost of the externality—the invasion cannot be undone. On the other hand, the 
external cost of pollution, for instance, can be controlled by the firm through its employment of 
new technology or reduction of output.  
  Policy responses can generally be categorized as either controlling invasions or 
preventing them. Examples of the former include attempts to limit the population of invasive 
species through pesticides and other means of population control, improving ecosystem 
resilience, and regulating invasive species uses. Prevention efforts include regulations on ballast 
water discharges and screening and quarantine of foreign goods at ports of entry. Despite 
seeming preferable to after-the-fact control of invasions, prevention is often ineffective and 
costly. It may, for instance, slow the movement of international trade. We turn to a complete 
consideration of the opportunities for prevention and control in Section 3. 
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Given heterogeneity in environmental resources among countries, trade in environmental 
amenities can be efficient and welfare improving. It can, however, also lead to destruction of 
resources that are undervalued by the governments controlling them. Thus, much like genetic 
and biological material transfers, trade in environmental amenities should be regulated to ensure 
welfare-maximizing outcomes. To some extent, these issues can be addressed by traditional trade 
models by considering environmental amenities like other traded commodities. However, several 
issues limit the applicability of traditional trade models in this context. First, many 
environmental amenities cannot be transported. Second, many are nonmarket goods. They are 
not bought and sold in a traditional marketplace that determines a price for the amenities. 
Instead, their values need to be imputed and are typically difficult to ascertain. Third, 
environmental activities can be associated with externalities that must be internalized to ensure 
optimal provision. 
  In the context of traditional trade models, countries with relative advantage in 
commercial goods may export them and import environmental amenities. As with other 
commodities, there are gains from trade in environmental goods, but environmental quality may 
decline in some countries. Relative-advantage considerations suggest that poor countries are 
more likely to engage in health-risking activities and sacrifice environmental preservation in 
return for revenue from production. Poor regions may even specialize in providing health- 
endangering activities. Indeed, the export of environmental bads by developed countries has 
produced pollution havens in developing countries. The relocation of smokestack industries to 
poor regions is just one manifestation of this trend that has received considerable attention in 
public dialogue. Research is needed to determine the implications of these relative advantage 
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important environmental resources. This analysis suggests some of the world’s most valuable 
environmental resources, located in developing countries, may be at risk as trade in 
environmental amenities continues. It adds urgency to the need for a system to document and 
value natural resources. 
  The basic trade model applies to well-defined commodities that are transferable and 
traded in markets, but environmental amenities are difficult to define and measure. Furthermore, 
environmental quality, health, and safety are not traded in markets. Environmental quality levels 
are often enforced by decree, and it is not clear that outcomes are consistent with what the 
models prescribe. Therefore, while trade theory can provide a general guideline, it is important to 
realize that we do not yet have effective policy tools to obtain optimal international allocation of 
environmental resources. Most environmental amenities are regulated and, while their imputed 
prices can be inferred through existing regulations and behavioral patterns, they cannot be 
observed directly in markets. Furthermore, some amenities, such as health risks, cannot be 
exported. This implies, for instance, that the value of a representative individual’s life will not be 
equal across countries. Some developing countries do not have the mechanisms or resources to 
assess and regulate health risks and may implicitly allow very risky production procedures. 
  Global environmental externalities are a source of growing concern. Many times, the 
environmental activities of a nation are not contained within its political boundaries, but rather 
confer benefits to or impose costs on other nations or the entire world. Ozone depletion, climate 
change, and acid rain are three global environmental problems impacted by the decisions of 
individual countries who do not internalize all of the benefits of cleaning up their production and 
who do not face all the costs of their pollution. Absent policy intervention, individual countries 
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social welfare. Critics of globalization claim it weakens national sovereignty, which impedes the 
ability of countries to establish and enforce their own environmental standards. In this context, 
however, national sovereignty is not the solution, but rather the problem (Frankel 2003). 
Consider that a forest-dense country, if permitted to trade in lumber, would choose to over-
exploit its forest resources relative to the socially optimal level. Its forest production would 
impose an external cost on the rest of the world in the form of lost biodiversity and foregone 
carbon sequestration. Therefore, the international community must develop mechanisms to 
correct this suboptimal outcome associated with unregulated free trade. While the Kyoto 
Protocol has attempted to regulate carbon emissions, the challenge is more widespread and 
requires not just a more effective, but also a broader effort.   
  Apart from the externalities associated with environmental activities, there are dynamic 
considerations that may lead countries to value natural resources differently than society. The 
consumption of natural resources is irreversible in some cases, and in others, it may lead to the 
depletion of exhaustible stocks. The relative valuation of these amenities consequently must 
account for present and future values. Standard trade models do not address these dynamic issues 
and should be extended. 
  Countries may differ in their abilities to control their resources. Some governments may 
be corrupt and exploit environmental amenities for their own gain. Others may lack mechanisms 
to enforce environmental standards and trade restrictions. Smuggling, in this context, is a critical 
issue in the preservation of natural resources, and we return to this issue in Section 5. 
Multilateral institutions should develop mechanisms to strengthen enforcement of environmental 
regulation and trade patterns in weaker countries. 
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demand for commodities produced by means that are perceived to offer food safety or 
environmental benefits. As per capita income rises, environmental protection and food safety 
become increasingly important to consumers. Today we see demand for organic foods and 
commodities that minimize environmental impacts. By removing information asymmetries 
between producers and consumers and permitting the differentiation of products according to 
production methods, international trade can improve market outcomes and permit efficient 
signaling of consumer preferences for environmental preservation to producers. A system of 
product labeling can be efficient and improve environmental outcomes, but it can also be used to 
discriminate against producers. The development of respected, enforced and nondiscriminatory 
labeling should be a priority of multilateral institutions. For instance, labels that identify organic, 
free-range, and lead-free products could create additional markets for goods and help consumers 
make more informed decisions. 
Section 3: Trade and Regulation of Food Safety and Environmental 
Quality 
The Doha Round is intended to address issues of food safety and the environment. In part, these 
objectives are necessitated by the development of new technologies, new outbreaks of disease, 
and consumer concerns. Increasingly, consumers are demanding greater levels of food safety and 
environmental protection. The growing number of these regulations may be responding to 
evolving consumer preferences, but they are also prone to political capture and may be used by 
protectionists to reduce competitive pressure from imports. Policies can potentially be influenced 
by consumers demanding cheap, safe food and domestic producers concerned about competition 
and the availability of cheap inputs, as well as exporters, taxpayers, and environmentalists. The 
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reduce the risk of adverse health outcomes to acceptable levels. The most important 
environmental regulations impacting trade include attempts by importing countries to reduce the 
risk of alien species invasions and demand higher environmental quality provision in source 
countries through the use of process and production methods (PPM) standards. 
Food Safety 
While not trade measures per se, food safety regulations and standards can significantly impede 
trade. In part, the growing use of these measures is a response to the rapid increase in scientific 
and technical knowledge. It is an issue for countries wanting to export food and for WTO 
members negotiating to expand food trade. 
  The goal of food policy regulations ought to be the provision, subject to resource 
constraints, of readily available food with characteristics demanded by consumers in a manner 
that is minimally distorting (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004). There is a strong economic 
rationale for food safety regulation to respond to market failures, which include, in part, 
information asymmetries that preclude consumers from making fully informed decisions. Food 
safety regulations can be aimed at reducing risk of bad health outcomes or ensuring minimum 
quality. Some regulate the content of food, such as the absence of disease or particular 
chemicals. Others regulate the production process, mandating rinsing and cleaning or banning 
the use of chemical pesticides or hormones. From an economic efficiency standpoint, content 
regulations are considered superior to process regulations. They permit the achievement of 
desired food outcomes without limiting the freedom of producers to use the most cost-effective 
processes. 
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Quantity restrictions, including bans, are a severe method and generally favored only if other 
mechanisms are infeasible because of technical limitations. Technical standards provide 
conditions that importers must meet to have access to markets. They may include limitations on 
size and weight of commodities or the use of specified processing technologies. While such 
standards can be justified on health and safety grounds, they may also be used to shift the 
comparative costs of producers and thereby discriminate against certain producers, such as those 
from a particular country. Such discrimination is a clear violation of both the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade and its successor, the WTO. Finally, regulation can also be classified as 
information requirements and include mandates that food products disclose certain information, 
such as the presence of carcinogens or other ingredients deemed hazardous to health. Information 
requirements may also limit the use of voluntary claims about food products to ensure credible 
information is conveyed to consumers. Claims of nutritional attributes, for instance, must be 
substantiated. In response to demand for organic products, many governments have imposed 
standards with which producers must comply if they are to receive government certification that 
products are organic. 
  Despite strong economic justification for regulation of food safety, countries may choose 
too restrictive or too open food safety laws relative to conditions of optimality. In particular, 
democratic governments are prone to choosing arbitrarily low levels of risk without weighing the 
costs and benefits. Governments tend to be afraid of low-probability high-risk events occurring. 
National governments often adopt a sequential decision-making process that considers first the 
risk effects of policy and then the costs and benefits. Incremental reductions of risk, therefore, 
may be favored regardless of the cost to domestic consumers and foreign producers. Regulation 
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competition from imports. Consumer advocacy groups may use the political process to achieve 
narrow agendas that are not consistent with welfare maximization. Given that WTO standards for 
food safety and animal and plant health, the Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) standards, are less 
transparent than tariffs or quotas, there is ample room for tweaking them to make them stronger 
than necessary for achieving optimal levels of social protection and to twist the related testing 
and certification procedures to make competing imports less competitive. The design of 
mechanisms that reduce the potential for food safety policy to be used for ulterior purposes, like 
protectionism, is an important element of trade negotiations. It is estimated that in 1995, $2.1 
billion of U.S. exports were blocked by animal and plant safety regulations that had little or no 
merit (Josling, Roberts, and Orden 2004). 
Rent Seeking in Regulation: The Case of Agricultural Biotechnology 
European resistance to genetically-modified organisms (GMO) is a prime example of how food 
safety concerns can carry the banner for protectionists. The European Union (EU) has banned the 
importation of food products containing GMO and has also restricted use of genetically-modified 
(GM) seed by domestic farmers. Europe imposed the restrictions on grounds that the risks of GM 
technology to human and environmental health are uncertain. However, over the course of more 
than a decade, and on millions of acres, the technology has proven to be a critical tool for 
improving agricultural productivity and reducing the use of chemical pesticides. No adverse 
effects have been documented. The regulations, therefore, seem unjustifiable from the standpoint 
of protecting human and environmental health.  
Regulations are not promulgated in a vacuum. Rather, regulators are influenced by self-
interested groups and can be assumed to maximize the weighted well-being of various groups, 
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each constituency are determined by the rent-seeking activity of the constituencies. In the case of 
agricultural biotechnology, regulation can be influenced by consumers, farmers, biotechnology 
firms, producers of competing inputs (such as chemical companies), and environmentalists. 
Consumer opinions about regulation can be important determinants of promulgated and de facto 
regulations, but consumer opinions are not formed in a vacuum either. In the case of agricultural 
biotechnology, they may be influenced by biotechnology firms and farmers who seek to increase 
revenues by expanding GMO sales and by environmentalists who oppose GMO. Opinions may 
also be formed on the basis of expert testimony. Scientists, in this context, may either endorse a 
technology or oppose it depending on how the technology affects their own welfare. In addition 
to the import of consumer opinion in the political and regulatory processes, consumers also 
influence retailers, who may impose de facto bans of technology to maximize their welfare. 
In the case of GMO, there is evidence to suggest the distinction between regulatory 
approaches of the United States and EU is not explained entirely by differences in consumer 
preferences. It is true that European consumers are less trusting of government and more 
concerned about food safety following lapses in food safety. Furthermore, the support for GMO 
among European experts is more tepid in the EU than the United States, perhaps because EU 
scientists did not stand to benefit from agricultural biotechnology like U.S. scientists, whose 
roles as innovators in the industry made them considerable stakeholders. Still, there is reason to 
believe European resistance to agricultural biotechnology is the result of rent seeking by other 
constituencies, namely producers of competing inputs. Intellectual property rights to GM 
technology are principally owned by U.S. firms like Monsanto and employed by U.S. farmers. 
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use of GM crops (Graff and Zilberman 2007).   
A nuanced model of rent seeking in the context of regulation suggests political economy 
and self-interest are responsible for considerably curtailing the market for agricultural 
biotechnology. The excessive regulation of GMO has been costly.  From 1990 to 1998, the 
agricultural biotechnology sector grew according to data on field trials, regulatory filings, and 
commercialization of new products.  After 1999, however, agricultural biotechnology has 
withered. Rent seeking from various constituencies produced a heavy regulatory burden at the 
same time consumer opinions formed by these constituencies led to de facto bans by retailers. 
The combined effect was to reduce the adoption of existing agricultural biotechnology and 
reduce the expected returns to innovation.  
The net effect of the contraction of agricultural biotechnology is that technologies that 
may have improved environmental quality indirectly by increasing yield and thus reducing crop 
acreage have not been introduced.  In particular, agricultural biotechnology has not been adopted 
in Africa, where even the present generation of technologies could have increased food supply. 
Yield data over the last 10 years suggest that productivity growth is slowing for crops that have 
not benefited from significant GMO adoption. Yield gains have been persistent for the one crop 
that has seen widespread use of GMO—cotton. Adoption of existing technology could have 
mitigated the food crisis that began in 2008 because of high demand for crops for bioenergy and 
for food to feed a growing world population that demands increasingly land-intensive diets. 
Given the demands for agriculture to feed and fuel a growing world population, heavy regulation 
of agricultural biotechnology should be reconsidered. 
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(as well as animals and plants), but such measures must have scientific justifications and cannot 
unnecessarily impede trade. Under the WTO’s SPS agreement, international standards are the 
benchmark against which national measures are judged. Standards that impose greater 
restrictions on imports than the international norms must be justified by science and based on an 
assessment of risk. 
  There are notable differences in the economic implications of classic trade barriers, such 
as tariffs and quantity restrictions, and product standards and regulations. The former are 
discriminatory border taxes, which generally result in inefficient resource allocations and reduce 
consumer welfare. By contrast, at least in principle, SPS standards are introduced by the 
government in the interest of society, to achieve the important social objective of protecting 
human, animal, and plant health. Food safety is a public good that would not be accounted for in 
a private market (Kindleberger 1983). Social losses arising from the elimination of food safety 
regulation could well exceed any associated economic efficiency gains. 
  The existing framework for guarding against the misuse of safety regulations is deficient 
in two main respects. First, it lacks a mechanism to develop consensus around the best available 
science. The best available science may be somewhat uncertain, but the existence of some 
uncertainty should not justify a precautionary approach that impedes international trade. 
Countries must be compelled to acknowledge the findings of the scientific community, 
particularly when research permits a consensus. Second, the current framework lacks an agreed- 
upon method for risk analysis. In the following section, we introduce a model of risk assessment 
that should be adopted to ensure acceptable levels of risk are achieved efficiently. 
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recent trade talks has centered on the extent to which harmonization should be pursued. 
Harmonization of safety regulations would reduce transactions costs of trade. The existence of a 
wide range of policy to regulate the same risk raises the costs to producers of doing business 
with different countries. Harmonization seeks to reduce the variation in policy so different 
production methods and content requirements for countries do not burden producers. Efficiency 
of production would be increased through harmonization as it reduces information asymmetries 
between buyers and sellers and promotes product commutability, thereby allowing for increased 
economies of scale and scope (Skyes 1995; and Kindleberger 1983).
1 Harmonization would also 
reduce the potential for food and environmental safety regulations being corrupted by 
protectionist motives. Harmonization ignores, however, the existence of heterogeneity in factor 
endowments, conditions, and preferences across countries.  
Expanding trade has brought into sharper focus the divergence among countries’ food 
safety regulations and standards. These variations may reflect differences among their 
populations’ tastes and preferences, ability to produce safe food, and willingness to pay for risk-
reducing technology. These differences introduce additional uncertainty to the use of food safety 
standards. From an economic standpoint, to the extent some nations value food safety more than 
others, it is efficient that they be permitted to demand safer foods, and markets should be 
permitted to operate. As factor endowments and climatic and political conditions vary, the costs 
of a given regulation will also vary. Governments should balance these costs against the benefit 
of regulation. In cases when the costs dominate benefits, the policy should not be pursued. 
Harmonization in the presence of heterogeneity, therefore, can be considerably distorting. 
                                                 
1 For more on the role of the WTO, and its ability to cope with food safety, see Athukorala and Jayasuriya (2003) 
and Hoekman (2002), among others. 
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Nations may attempt to preserve environmental quality at home and abroad by intervening in 
international trade via two primary mechanisms: enforcing PPM standards and blocking the 
importation of invasive species. Under existing trade agreements, PPM standards can be used to 
influence environmental activities in foreign countries and to reduce the effects of global 
environmental externalities so long as they do not discriminate against particular producers. 
Intervention throughout the trade system can reduce the risk of species invasion, though it may 
be combined with monitoring and control of the invaders. 
  The EU provides a very contemporary example of how PPM standards may be used to 
affect environmental protection. It is, as of this report, considering a ban on imports of biofuels 
produced on lands it deems ecologically sensitive. Its aim is to halt or at least slow the 
conversion of natural habitat to crop production, particularly in Latin America and Asia, where 
forests are being cleared to plant biofuel feedstock. The proposal would ban biofuel imports 
produced on land recently converted to productive uses, including those produced in wetlands, 
swamps, marshes, and grasslands. This proposal provides an example of how environmental 
concerns have become paramount and absolute in the minds of regulators. It ignores the benefits 
of biofuel production in terms of increased energy supply and reduced carbon emissions by 
indiscriminately declaring all unfarmed land important from an environmental perspective. 
Certainly some lands offer greater benefit in their natural state than in production of energy, but 
others should be recruited to solving global energy and climate change challenges. This proposal 
is not an efficient method of correcting externalities, nor is it based on science. It may be the 
result of political efforts by environmentalists or may be intended as a trade barrier to reduce 
competition to European biofuel producers, who face higher costs than developing countries. The 
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result of political economy rather than a rational decision process. 
  In alien species and disease invasion management, governments seek policies that 
maximize total social welfare subject to many constraints, including the limited budgets of 
regulatory and enforcement agencies, the profit-maximizing behavior of importers and growers, 
and the surplus-maximizing behavior of consumers, market-clearing conditions, as well as 
political, legal, technological, and information constraints. Policies should seek to balance the 
use of incentives, monitoring, and control along the species-movement process. The potential for 
rejection of imports prior to shipment, as well as rejection of imports and the imposition of fines 
at the border of importing countries provide importers with incentives to ensure their shipments 
are clean. After alien species have entered the importing country, farmers can be subsidized to 
detect invasions and protect against them. Monitoring can be done overseas and at the border, as 
well as within country to detect invasions. Control of invasive species includes treatment of 
shipments overseas and at the border, as well as chemical spraying to control or eradicate 
populations within the country. Fig. 1 illustrates the movement of invasive species from the 
country of origin through the importation process and highlights the opportunities for 
intervention throughout the process. 
  Cost-benefit analyses are typically used to determine which projects should be pursued. 
A project should be undertaken if expected present value of control or environmental project 
exceeds or equals the expected present value of the cost of the project. A common response by 
decision-makers to the risk of invasion is to ban imports of any commodity that poses such a 
risk. Such a response ignores the benefits of imports and invasive species themselves, as well as 
less blunt policy options that may be available, such as control or financial incentives.  
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Fig. 1. Species population movement process: Driven by biology and economics 
 
  The determination of optimal policy response for species invasions is difficult for several 
reasons, not the least of which is the difficulty of assigning value to nonmarketed environmental 
services. The challenge of determining the full range of effects of invasions has yet to be 
overcome in the literature. It is compounded by the diverse effects of invasions on other species 
and the time-dependent magnitude of effects. Evaluation is further hindered by the endogeneity 
of control dynamics. Risk of invasion and cost of invasion, for instance, are functions of human 
impacts on ecosystems and human effort to reduce risk (Dalmazzone 2000). In general, lands 
altered for agriculture or other uses are more susceptible to invasion and support fast growth of 
invasive species. Mitigation and adaptation efforts, on the other hand, reduce invasion risk.  
  Besides the endogeneity of risk, the nature of invasion risk poses additional challenges. 
  21The probability of invasion is typically low, but the consequences of invasion are quite high. A 
single invasion can be calamitous. The power of expected utility is diminished with low-
probability catastrophic events (Chichilinsky 1998). People treat very unlikely events by either 
overestimating their probabilities of realization or setting their probabilities to zero. Invasions are 
also one-time events often independent of history, making estimation of probability density 
functions impossible (Horan et al. 2002). 
  Because invasion is uncertain and a low-probability event and because prevention efforts 
do not stop invasions with certainty, it may be preferable to expend limited resources on control 
of invasions once they occur. In some cases, it may be optimal to undertake considerable control 
effort as soon as an invasion is detected in the hope of exterminating the invasive species before 
exponential growth. In other cases, it may be optimal to try to maintain the invasive species 
population at an acceptable level over an indefinite period of time. 
Alien species invasions impose costs not often internalized by those responsible for them, 
such as importers. Therefore, there is a need for financial incentives that can align private and 
social costs. Strong property rights and institutions to protect them, as well as liability rules, can 
help to internalize the externality. Perrings, Dalmazzone, and Williamson (2005) propose 
importers of potential invaders be required to purchase insurance in case their imports do cause 
an invasion.  
Invasion prevention is a weakest-link public good. Benefits to society of prevention effort 
are determined by the weakest member of society. An invasion is the result of interactions 
among countries, including a country that is home to a potential invader and other countries 
connected to it through trade in goods or people. Efforts to contain or eradicate pests will fail 
even if all but one member of society does so successfully. This suggests there will be 
  22underinvestment in prevention and points to the need for a national policy for prevention and 
control when invasions occur within borders and an international program for invasive species 
that cross borders (Perrings, Dalmazzone, and Williamson 2005). The creation of institutions to 
support the countries least effective at preventing invasions could help to overcome the weakest- 
link aspect of invasions. An international institution to monitor and report on alien species 
invasions could coordinate global responses to what is increasingly a global problem. 
  While economics can address the market failures posed by species invasions, it is 
important to realize the role of political institutions in determining responses to the problem. 
Optimal responses to invasion risk may be to increase trade restrictions. Such policies may not 
be implemented, however, because of political pressures for trade liberalization. In addition, 
members of society are typically unwilling to support considerable expenditures on prevention 
when the probability of invasion is low and the costs of invasion are uncertain. Democratic 
institutions, therefore, can be a contributing factor to underinvestment in prevention and control.  
Section 4: A Model for Risk Assessment 
As the foregoing discussion of food safety and environmental regulation elucidates, the 
development of a coherent method of risk assessment in the presence of uncertainty is important 
for efficient patterns of trade. Regulatory decisions involve not just managing risk, but managing 
risk compounded by uncertainty. Furthermore, it is evident that decision makers and the general 
public are quite sensitive about the relatively unlikely prospects that these risks are large, 
implying a need for decision methods that explicitly incorporate uncertainty in a practical 
manner. We proceed in this section by presenting a model that essentially applies a safety rule 
  23decision criterion to a probabilistic model of risk generation. It can be used to weigh tradeoffs in 
the regulation of human health, food safety, and environmental health.  
The model presented here is consistent with risk assessment methodologies developed in 
public health. It measures risk explicitly as the probability of data occurring. Decision-theoretic 
and economic models, on the other hand, measure risk as the deviations from the norm or 
average. Before proceeding, we should clarify that risk, in this context, will refer to the 
probability that an individual selected at random will suffer an adverse health event, such as 
illness or death. The functions relating risk and the variables that generate it are not known with 
certainty and are subject to error, the magnitude of which will be measured by uncertainty. 
  Following the methods of Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988), we develop a multiplicative 
risk-generating function that relates relevant activities to health or environmental risk. For 
instance, one can model the chronic health risks arising from the use of contaminated drinking 
water as the product of the level of contamination introduced into the environment, the rate at 
which the contaminant enters the water supply, rates of water consumption, and dose-response 
rates. It can also model food and environmental safety risk as the product of farm level practices 
such as pesticide use, the contribution of practices in processing, and the contribution of 
inspection. 
  Formally, the health risk of a representative individual, R, is the product of the following 
functions: 
 (i)     f is the risk contribution of farm-level practices, such as chemical use. For 
instance, it may relate the level of pesticide residues on apples to pesticides applied by a farmer. 
is the level of pesticide use,   is a policy parameter that can be thought of as affecting 
incentives for damage control activity at the site, and   is a random disturbance. 
1(X1,β1,ε1)
   X1 β1
ε1
  24 (ii)     f is the risk contribution of processing practices, which can include 
processes that expose food products to additional chemical or disease as well as processes that 
are risk reducing, such as pasteurization or rinsing.  is the level of processing activity and 
is again a government-determined policy parameter that can influence processing decisions, 
either by direct control or incentives.  is a random disturbance. This function relates, for 
instance, pesticide residues on imports to the level of rinsing and the degree of food processing 





 (iii)      is an inspection contribution function, which is a function of policy,  , 
and a random element  . It models the effect of import inspection on health outcomes, where it 
is assumed that with some error, governments can detect and destroy imported commodities or 
otherwise eliminate health risks.  
f3(β3,ε3) β3
ε3
 (iv)      is the quantity consumed, where P is price,  is a policy parameter 
influencing consumption, and    is a random element.  The product  is equal to 
the overall exposure level of a representative individual and is denoted by E. Finally, 
f4(P,β4,ε4) β4
ε4 f4(⋅) f3(⋅) f2(⋅) f1(⋅)
 (v)     f is the dose–response function, which relates health risk to the level of 
exposure of a given substance. It relates, for instance, the proclivity of contracting cancer to the 
ingestion of particular levels of chemical. It is based on available medical treatment methods, 
, and a random variable,  . Dose–response functions are estimated in epidemiological and 
toxicological studies of human biology. 
5(β5,ε5)
 β5 ε5
In practice, the specification of the risk generation function is based on risk assessment 
models developed by public health professionals. For example, studies to control cancer risk 
  25caused by groundwater contamination have used risk generation models based on the work of 
Crouch and Wilson (1981), as well as Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen (1989). 
Assume the random elements in each function,  for   are distributed log 
normal and are uncorrelated. Then, the log of health risk R is distributed normally with mean 
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μi = E fi ⋅ () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦ and σi
2 =Var fi ⋅ () ⎡ ⎣ ⎤ ⎦. 
Both the mean and variance are assumed to be nonincreasing in  , i.e.,  β ={β1,...,β5}
   
∂μi
∂βi
≤ 0 and 
∂σi
∂βi
≤ 0, and the social cost of regulation is assumed to exhibit decreasing 
marginal productivity, i.e.,








2 ≥ 0.  
  Next, if we can estimate the functions   and  we can determine 
the optimal combination of pollution control, exposure avoidance, and medical treatment using 
simple maximization techniques. 
f1(⋅), f2(⋅), f3(⋅), f4(⋅), f5(⋅),
  The safety rule approach to regulation seeks to limit to some small amount the frequency 
of violations of a predetermined standard. In the context of health risk regulation, this goal can 
be expressed as ensuring that the incidence of the relevant adverse health effect (here the log 
health risk R), exceeds some maximum allowable level, denoted , no more than a fraction of 
the time  1
R0
−α.This can be written formally as  
   (1)     Pr (R  ≥  R0)  ≤  1  −  α.
  26The regulatory decision problem can therefore be expressed as the choice of a set of 
optimal policies β that minimize total social cost of meeting the safety rule (3):
2
 
   
Max
β
  − C β ()
s.t.  μi
i ∑ + F α () σi
2
i ∑ ≤ R0
. (2) 
  This approach has been used to analyze worker safety by Lichtenberg, Spear, and 
Zilberman (1993) and by Harper and Zilberman (1992), biotechnology regulations by 
Lichtenberg (2006), food safety policy by Sunding and Zivin (2000) and Taylor and Hoffman 
(2001), and waterborne disease control by Zivin and Zilberman (2002), as well as water quality 
regulation by Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen (1989), among others.  
The solution to this problem is a set of policies β that can be characterized in terms of the 
total cost to society of implementing these policies (C(β)) in order to achieve a risk standard   
with a margin of safety  
R0
α. For simplicity, assume   denotes total social cost of the ith 
regulatory activity. Hence, 
βi
   
C(β) = βi
i ∑ and the necessary conditions for social cost 
minimization are 
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denotes the elasticity of the standard deviation of the ith policy with respect to the ith action. 
                                                 
2 Let R(α) denote the level of log risk exceeded with probability 1-α and F(α) denote the value of the standard 
normal distribution which is exceeded with probability 1-α. Then, and following Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988), 
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  27λ represents the shadow price and can also be viewed as the implied value of life (as will be 
argued below).  Such an approach was used, for example, in Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen 
(1989), where the regulatory objective was to establish a cost-minimizing water quality standard 
such that the risk of cancer from chemical residues is at or below an acceptable level with 
different levels of statistical significance.  
The safety approach introduced in the current section assumes two key variables— 
maximum allowable risk     and the marginal level of safety  R0 α —are given. In reality, both 
variables are set at the decision process. Choosing the marginal level of safety α is essentially 
equivalent to setting a confidence level for hypothesis testing and, therefore, is not controversial. 
As a practical matter, we can simply choose from the levels prevalent in scientific work (e.g., 
0.95, 0.99). It might, however, become an instrument for protection if the marginal level of 
safety is applied at each stage of the risk generation function. For example, if it is applied 
separately to the production-processing-distribution stages, and if countries agree to 
 1−α = 0.95, then the marginal level of safety equals   We may, therefore, 
observe creeping safety (Lichtenberg and Zilberman 1988). Even though there exists 




The determination of the maximum allowable risk is less straightforward. This parameter 
is likely to be subject to political debate, and selection of a specific risk standard tends to be a 
political decision. Since policy analysis, in general, is aimed at choosing standards    , as well 
as regulatory measures 
(R0)
(β), it is beneficial to examine together instrument choices and social 
costs associated with the entire range of feasible standards. In other words, it is useful to derive a 
trade-off curve between social cost and risk given margin of safety. We call this the Risk-Cost 
Trade-Off (RCTO) curve.   
  28  The RCTO curve can be derived, for a given margin of safety, by solving the cost 
minimization problem given in equation (1) for every relevant risk standard.
3 Initially, given 
and     R0  α, the optimal policy is derived:  This solution is then substituted into the 
objective function to yield      This exercise, done for all plausible values 
of maximum allowable risk, yields an uncertainty-adjusted cost curve for risk reduction (see Fig. 
2). Points above the curve represent inefficient policies used to achieve a given risk standard 












Fig. 2. The Risk-Cost Trade-Off curve 
 
                                                 
3 A similar curve was derived in Lichtenberg, Zilberman, and Bogen (1989). 
  29 It can be shown that regulatory expenditure   decreases (increases) as the level of 
maximum allowable risk      and the margin of safety increase (decrease).
C(⋅)
R0
4 These results can be 
used to show that the RCTO curve is downward sloping in risk standards. Further, the RCTO 
curve shifts out with higher margins of safety (see Fig. 2). The RCTO curve can, therefore, be 
used as a decision tool to evaluate and compare standards.  
  The slope of the RCTO curve, the Lagrange multiplier λ, represents the marginal cost of 
risk reduction. This shadow price can be viewed as an estimate of social willingness to pay for 
risk reduction. Therefore, the multiplier λ can be used to construct an uncertainty-adjusted 
estimate for the value of saving a life. This estimate can be used to enforce consistency in the 
valuation of a statistical life, since minimizing the cost of reducing risks to human health and 
safety implies equal marginal cost of risk reduction across sources of risk.  
Inconsistency is, however, observed and not owed entirely to political economy. Cropper 
et al. (1992), for example, show that U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) decisions are 
not consistent. The reason is that the implied value of life of a pesticide applicator is 
approximated at $35 million, whereas the life of a consumer who may be exposed to pesticide 
residues is valued at only $60,000. The authors attribute these differences to EPA’s bias toward 
reduction of large individual risks. Van Houtven and Cropper (1996) also find evidence that EPA 
is biased toward minimizing risk for vulnerable populations, as opposed to populations at large. 
Although inconsistencies may be acceptable, this framework is still useful for screening large 
biases in the decision process. Moreover, it can be used to better understand the motives of 
regulators in setting standards. 
                                                 
4 See also Lichtenberg and Zilberman (1988).  
  30Section 5: Political, Institutional, and Firm-Level Considerations 
Political and Institutional Response 
While science, public health, and statistics establish much of the intellectual foundation for 
intervention, regulatory measures are the outcome of a bargaining process between the regulator 
and various interest groups. This political process can affect the margin of safety and the 
computed benefit from the regulatory measures. 
Formally, the political process can be modeled as a cooperative game, à la Harsanyi 
(1963) and Zusman (1976), or as a noncooperative game, à la Bernheim and Whinston (1986) 
and Grossman and Helpman (1994). The fundamental assumption guiding both models is that 
any individual who is affected by government policy has an incentive to influence the 
policymaker. Food safety regulation affects the regulatory agency, consumers, farmers, the retail 
food sector, incumbent firms, start-up firms and new entrants, as well as firms in competing 
sectors. The regulatory measures affect each group differently and, therefore, create different, 
and in many times opposing, incentives. Competition among groups and their desire to influence 
decisions and regulatory measures determines the political process by which regulations are 
promulgated.   
For example, the regulatory agency's employees may benefit from more power and, 
therefore, seek stricter regulation simply because it enables them to get higher income. 
Consumers, on the other hand, care about their well-being (consumer welfare). In Europe, for 
example, consumers perceive biotechnology is hazardous to their health. They therefore support 
the regulatory decision banning imports of transgenic crops to Europe. The production side also 
faces different, and in many times opposing incentives. Using examples from the biotechnology 
sector, it can be shown that the first and, even more so, the second generation biotechnology 
  31products save production costs and increase yields. Farmers, therefore, should support weaker 
regulatory measures on biotechnology. The retail food sector wants to minimize its exposure to 
food safety problems, which leads to negative publicity. Hence, all else being equal, the retail 
food sector benefits from stricter regulation. The incumbent firms, such as the major 
biotechnology firms, benefit from barriers to entry and increasing returns to scale. Thus they 
push for stricter regulations. Firms in competing sectors also benefit from barriers to entry and 
investment, and therefore join incumbent firms in luring the regulatory agency to set stricter 
standards. Start-up firms and new entrants, on the other hand, argue for weaker regulatory 
standards. Finally, environmental groups strive to influence the regulatory agency to set 
measures that they perceive as beneficial to the environment.  
The decision to apply regulatory measures and the incentives of the different groups to 
influence this decision is not, however, limited to a certain sector. Regulation is determined by a 
bargaining process, which is political in nature and attempts to incorporate the different factors 
into the decision process. The challenge is in addressing the different incentives, while not 
slipping into protectionist policy. In Europe, transgenic crops are banned, although there is not 
even one example where a transgenic crop became a health problem.  
To keep political considerations at bay, and to maximize social welfare (not income of a 
well-connected sector), a transparent and coherent methodology needs to be developed. The risk 
assessment model strives to meet this challenge. Harmonizing the methodology used, not the 
standard levels, given that countries can agree on the model's key parameters, seems to us a more 
promising approach. 
In the context of transgenic crops, Zilberman (2006) argued that a major flaw in the 
current regulatory process is that each new trait is evaluated separately, without taking into 
  32account alternatives. Lichtenberg (2006), on the other hand, argued that uncertainty is the 
principal cause of concern regarding these crops. This better understanding of policymakers' risk 
assessment, as well as the understanding that conducting risk assessment and risk-benefit 
analysis in isolation is sub-optimal, implies that incorporating economics into the risk assessment 
process is a preferred alternative. 
Firm-Level and Individual Response 
To date, the pest and disease exclusion policies previously discussed have been developed 
primarily on the basis of scientific risk assessment without economic analysis of the response of 
importers to border enforcement policies. Existing policies are based on the reasoning that 
increased enforcement effort will result in higher detection levels or, more specifically, that 
increased inspection will result in a higher number of interceptions and, in turn, higher 
compliance. In addition to a deterrence effect under which importers respond to increased 
enforcement with increased care, importers may respond in ways that yield unintended effects. 
For example, importers may respond to the increased costs imposed by inspections by choosing 
not to bring goods into a country, or they may ship a reduced amount. Moreover, different types 
of firms are likely to respond to enforcement in different ways, affecting socially optimal 
enforcement and social welfare.  
  Firms choose which ports to ship to on the basis of heterogeneity in inspection effort and 
competency.  Thus, an increase in enforcement or other costs or a decrease in revenues at a given 
port will encourage a firm to shift to another port, potentially farther away. A firm may shift to a 
low-inspection port if the gain outweighs revenue loss. Firms with high initial contamination are 
less likely to choose ports with high penalties or high treatment costs borne by importers. 
Increased enforcement at a particular port will lead to separating equilibria in which firms with 
  33low profit and high exposure opt not to export at all, while others reduce output or switch to low 
enforcement ports. Ports may vary in their ease of discovering contaminated commodities. A 
port may have relative difficulty of discovery, but high inspection levels and still be chosen by a 
high risk firm. 
  Port shopping implies that firms consider the costs and benefits associated with location, 
including such factors as inspection intensity, entry fees, distance to port, market conditions, etc. 
Different firms will weigh these trade-offs differently; high risk firms are likely to select ports 
that are perceived to have lax enforcement regimes, perhaps at the expense of greater 
transportation costs. Low-risk firms are likely to value distance to port of entry. 
  Trade is, of course, a repeated game. Enforcement agencies could, for instance, target 
known bad actors for more thorough inspection or higher fees. Additional research should 
consider the potential for firm-specific enforcement regimes as well as variation in inspection 
across different types of ports. 
As mentioned above, greater enforcement effort or rate of discovery raises the incentive 
for avoidance, including smuggling of commodities like agricultural products. In particular, 
increased enforcement impels producers to use the black market. Smuggled goods are not 
detected at ports of entry and are, therefore, not monitored thereafter. They can lead to dire 
health and environmental consequences. Devastating species invasions, for instance, are the 
result of smuggling either of invasive species or of contaminated commodities. Increased 
enforcement may not result in reduced food and environmental risk if it induces greater illicit 
trade.  
Human behavior should also be factored into to the decision process. Consumers may 
respond to stricter regulation by taking fewer personal safety measures (a similar effect is also 
  34observed in insurance markets). They also react to safety information. Responses will vary by 
consumer (e.g., Viscusi, Magat, and Huber 1987). Firm behavior should also be factored into the 
decision process. Melcher (2003), for example, argues that firm compliance with regulatory 
measures is imperfect. Monsanto and its partners, for example, violated federal regulation by 
planting transgenic crops 44 times between 1990 and 2001. 
The risk assessment model outlined in Section 4 provides a structure that allows 
incorporation of human behavior. One example is presented in Lichtenberg (2006), who extends 
the risk assessment model to incorporate firm behavior. Such modifications are straightforward 
conceptually; a lack of sound empirical work to guide the practitioner makes them difficult to 
implement.     
Section 6: An Agenda for Trade Talks 
International trade has important effects on food safety and environmental preservation that 
should be taken into account in the Doha Round of trade talks. From the spread of disease and 
other biological material to the ability of trade partners to influence environmental and food 
safety practices in source countries, the effects are wide ranging and can be beneficial or quite 
costly. Food safety and environmental regulation can efficiently solve market imperfections to 
assure acceptable levels of risk to human health and protect valued natural resources. They can 
also be used to protect producers from the competitive pressures of trade and thereby distort 
trade considerably. 
  We have proposed a framework for efficient regulation of trade with respect to food 
safety and environmental health risks. Political economy considerations may, however, interfere 
with the implementation of efficient regulation. It is important, therefore, to identify where the 
  35political economy has produced inefficient regulation and to determine who wins and who loses. 
While the use of uniform standards would preclude the subversion of safety regulations by 
interest groups, it would also reduce efficiency in the presence of heterogeneity across countries. 
Rather than requiring all countries to follow the same standards (and in effect value life, safety, 
and domestic environmental resources equally), we suggest imposing a uniform decision-process 
for countries to follow. To the extent trading countries can agree on a decision-making process 
that uses a risk assessment model and the best available science and empirical findings, the 
capture of food safety and environmental regulation by special interests and protectionists can be 
mitigated. Where politics is thought to have overcome science, trade organizations should 
demand to know the decision rules that produced suspect regulation. A decision rule that 
deviates from a consistent and rational procedure based on the best available science should be 
easy to identify. 
  Economics should not be ignored in the promulgation of regulation. Indeed, if it is, then 
regulation may have effects opposite the intentions of regulators. As we have seen, in certain 
circumstances, increased enforcement effort does not reduce risk to an importing country and 
does not induce greater care on the part of exporters. The ways in which institutions, firms, and 
individuals respond to regulation must enter into the decision-making process. Many of the 
environmental and human health issues discussed here can be resolved by the development of 
proper incentives to influence behavior. Countries, for instance, need to be induced to protect the 
socially optimal level of natural resources, which in many cases are global public goods. If they 
are not afforded proper incentives, too much biodiversity may be sacrificed for revenue from 
production.  
  36The political institutions in countries are also subject to rent seeking. Regulators may 
want greater power derived from a broader regime of regulation. They may be influenced by 
interest groups. Democratic governments, themselves, may overprotect their food supplies 
because of fear of low-probability catastrophic events. They may also underinvest in risk- 
reducing measures if they are perceived to reduce competitiveness in a global economy. Port 
inspection regimes must consider how firms respond to changes in enforcement—namely, that 
they will ship to ports that afford them the highest expected profits and that they may reduce 
output and pre-shipment treatment of commodities amid greater enforcement effort.  
The behavior of individuals can also be important. For instance, the delay in detection of 
alien species invasions can be partially overcome by incentivizing farmers to monitor for 
invasions. Consumers may respond to stricter regulation by undertaking fewer risk-reducing 
behaviors themselves. All of these considerations are important and, if ignored, can cause 
regulation to be counterproductive. 
  Multilateral institutions like the WTO are important for addressing the environmental and 
food safety issues considered here. A system for dealing with global public goods must be 
established. It should be broader and more effective than Kyoto to reflect the fact that global 
environmental problems extend beyond carbon emissions and also include biodiversity loss as 
well as other forms of pollution. Protection against species invasions is a weakest link public 
good, and multilateral institutions should provide support to weaker countries to improve their 
monitoring and enforcement regimes. Likewise, weak governments may lack the ability to 
enforce optimizing food safety and environmental regulation. Support from stronger countries 
can improve welfare in both countries. International support for documenting and valuing natural 
resources is also urgently needed as higher rates of trade endanger environmental amenities. 
  37Finally, a trusted international food labeling system could permit markets to operate efficiently 
by providing consumers with choice in terms of the quality and processes and methods of 
production of commodities they consume. 
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